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California Arbitration Reform:
The Aftermath
By RUTH V. GLICK*
NOT TOO LONG ago, the only mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clause imposed on consumers was found in documents used to open
an account in a securities brokerage firm or in a contract that Kaiser
Permanente patients must sign in order to receive medical treatment.
Today these imposed arbitration clauses are found everywhere, forc-
ing individuals to forgo a civil lawsuit and pursue any legal action
through arbitration. When you buy a house, take a job, open a bank
account, receive health care, sign up for telecommunications service,
and even purchase season football tickets, you may be required to ac-
cept a dispute resolution policy that includes mandatory arbitration.
These provisions surrender your right to pursue a claim in court or be
part of a class-action lawsuit.
Consumers, employees, and patients do not have the opportunity
to negotiate these clauses which are offered on a "take it or leave it"
basis. These contracts of adhesion are typically presented in a stan-
dard printed form prepared by a business entity, leaving the consumer
with the choice to either agree to the terms or forgo the benefits of
the contract. For the most part, the courts in California have enforced
these arbitration agreements, so long as they are not unconscionable.'
* Full-time neutral arbitrator and mediator with over twenty years of experience;
Adjunct Assistant ProfessQr of Arbitration and Alternate Dispute Resolution Law,
University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Director, Legislative Chair, and Past
President, California Dispute Resolution Council; Director, The Mediation Society;
Director and Fellow, College of Commercial Arbitrators; and member, commercial panel,
American Arbitration Association.
1. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs. Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 682-93
(Cal. 2000) (not enforcing an employment mandatory arbitration agreement because of
an unconscionable damage limitations clause, however, indicating that statutory claims can
be vindicated through arbitration if certain minimum rights for the employee were present
in the clause, including arbitrator neutrality, provision of adequate discovery, no limitation
of remedies, and no expense to the employee greater than it would have been had the
matter been taken to court); see also Little v. Auto Stiegler, 63 P.3d 979, 989 (Cal. 2003)
(extending the Armendariz reasoning to apply these factors to non-statutory claims as well);
Broughton v. Cigna, 988 P.2d 67, 76 (Cal. 1999) (enforcing the arbitration of common law
and statutory health care claims but not claims for injunctive relief); Cruz v. PacifiCare
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Given the steady judicial enforcement of these agreements, con-
sumer advocates have become frustrated with federal and state inac-
tion to limit mandatory arbitration. In the fall of 2001, the San
Francisco Chronicle ran a series of articles featuring horror stories
about the inequities of arbitration, citing as problems the prospect for
partiality by repeat player arbitrators hoping to be selected again and
assertions about ties between arbitration provider organizations and
those repeat players. 2 While arbitration provider organizations
claimed the series was inaccurate, the articles punctuated consumer
concern with business-imposed arbitration.
I. California Legislation Aimed at Regulating Arbitrators and
Arbitration Providers
The California Legislature took notice of the San Francisco
Chronicle series, as did Governor Gray Davis, who was mindful of a
recent arbitration dealing with state motor vehicle refunds in which
embarrassingly large legal fees had been awarded.3 They wanted legis-
lation that would protect consumers from the perceived inequities of
mandatory arbitration. However, there had been a barrier in drafting
such legislation because the United States Supreme Court has clearly
held that state legislation cannot treat arbitration agreements in con-
tracts differently than it treats provisions in contracts as a whole. In
Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,4 the Supreme Court struck down a
Montana state law that called for certain notice requirements in arbi-
tration contracts, holding that section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA") preempted the Montana law.5 The FAA states that written ar-
Health Systems, Inc., 66 P.3d 1157, 1164 (Cal. 2003) (extending Broughton to hold that
claims under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act for injunctive relief were not subject to
arbitration).
2. See Reynolds Holding, Millions Are Losing Their Legal Rights, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7,
2001, at Al; Reynolds Holding, Can Public Count on Fair Arbitration?, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 8,
2001, at Al5; Reynolds Holding, Judges'Actions Cast Shadow on Court Integrity, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 9, 2001, at A13.
3. In that arbitration, a panel of retired judges awarded $88.5 million in fees for
lawyers in a smog fee refund case due to an absence of a cap on attorneys' fees. It became a
political embarrassment for the Governor. See Rone Tempest, Judge Rejects $88.5-Million Fee
for Lauyers, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2001, at A3.
4. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
5. Id. at 683; see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995)
("States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law
principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause 'upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.' What States may not do is decide that a
contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair
enough to enforce its arbitration clause.") (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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bitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.
6
A. Legislation Directed at Arbitrators
With this preemption challenge in mind, the legislature directed
its regulation of arbitration not at the arbitration contract itself but at
arbitrators and arbitration providers. Later in 2001 Senate Bill 475 was
passed and signed by the Governor. 7 The bill called for the adoption
of additional ethics standards for neutral arbitrators to be drafted as
minimum requirements, supplementing existing statutes.8 The stan-
dards were to be written by staff lawyers of the Judicial Council, which
is the administrative and policy board of the California courts.9 A
nineteen-member Blue Ribbon Panel of arbitrators, judges, lawyers,
consumer advocates, legislative staff, and academics, all with diverse
interests, weighed in on the issues.' 0
The Judicial Council staff and the Blue Ribbon Advisory Commit-
tee were confronted with the challenge of converting ethical stan-
dards, which are normally presented as aspirational,II into mandatory
statutory requirements with consequences for failure to comply.' 2 As a
result of their efforts, The Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in
Contractual Arbitration ("Ethics Standards") became effective July 1,
2002.13 They are incorporated into California Code of Civil Procedure
Section 1281.85 and substantially expand arbitrator disclosure re-
6. See Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 683; Fed. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
7. S. 475, 2001 Leg. (Cal. 2001).
8. See id. § 4 (codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.85 (West Supp. 2003)).
9. See id.; see also Francis 0. Spalding, Judicial Council's Drafting of Arbitrator Ethics Stan-
dards Is Indefensible, S.F. DAILYJ., Mar. 25, 2002 (making a case for separation of powers
between legislative and judicial function and calling into question the propriety of the
Judicial Council "legislating" rules for arbitrators).
10. SeeJay Folberg, Arbitration Ethics-Is California the Future?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp.
RESOL. 343, 345-46 (2003). The chair of the panel, appointed by the ChiefJustice, was Jay
Folberg, law professor and former dean of the University of San Francisco School of Law.
See id. at 346 n.14.
11. For aspirational codes, see AM. BAR ASS'N & Am. ARBITRATION ASS'N, THE CODE OF
ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (1977), available at http://www.adr.org/
index2.1 .jsp?JSPssid=15718 (last accessed Oct. 24, 2003); Am. BAR ASS'N &AM. ARBITRATION
ASS'N, DRAFT CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, or REVISED CODE
OF ETHICS (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercial-disputes.pdf
(last accessed Oct. 24, 2003) (this new draft of the code has not yet been approved as the
official policy of the American Bar Association).
12. See Folberg, supra note 10, at 346.
13. See CAL. R. CT., app. div. VI, ETHICS STANDARDS FOR NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS IN CON-
TRACTUAL ARBITRATION (rev. 2003), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/appen-
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quirements, regulate arbitrator action, increase parties' ability to dis-
qualify arbitrators, and may even provide additional grounds to vacate
an award. 1 4
The Ethics Standards apply to all arbitrators in all contractual ar-
bitrations in California. Standard 8 of the Ethics Standards addition-
ally applies to all consumer arbitrations and requires arbitrators to
make additional disclosures about the relationships between the pro-
vider organization and a party or lawyer involved in a consumer
arbitration. 1 5
B. Legislation Directed at Arbitration Providers
Since the Ethics Standards only have jurisdiction over arbitrators
and not arbitration provider organizations, 16 the California Legisla-
ture enacted additional statutes to regulate the arbitration providers
in 2002. Under these statutes private alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") providers now must provide specific data about arbitrations
they have administered within the past five years. 17 They must post the
data on an internet website in a computer-searchable format.18 The
information must include names of non-consumer parties, how many
times they have been parties to an arbitration administered by the
ADR provider, the type of dispute, the amount of the claim, and the
name and fee of the arbitrator. 19
Arbitration providers are also restricted from administering any
consumer arbitrations if the provider has had any type of financial
involvement with a party or attorney within the past year, or if they
have a financial interest in the provider.20 All costs must be waived for
indigent consumers,21 and neither arbitrators nor arbitration provid-
ers may impose costs or fees on a non-prevailing consumer, even if
there is a "loser pays" provision in the agreement. 22
dix/appdiv6.pdf (last accessed Oct. 24, 2003) [hereinafter ETHICS STANDARDS]. The
Standards were revised for clarification purposes six months later. See id.
14. See infra text accompanying note 59.
15. See id. std. 8.
16. See Folberg, supra note 10, at 345 (referencing Senate Bill 475).
17. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a) (West Supp. 2003).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 1281.92.
21. Id. § 1284.3(b)(1).
22. Id. § 1284.3(a).
[Vol. 38
Governor Davis vetoed one of the 2002 legislative bills because of
its complexity.23 There are two current proposed pieces of legislation.
In one proposal, fees can be disgorged from the arbitration provider,
and further administration of the case is precluded if the arbitration is
vacated by a court.24 Another bill would eliminate the exclusive desig-
nation of any one private arbitration provider in an arbitration agree-
ment, allowing the consumer to have the option to switch arbitrators
and arbitration providers when a dispute arises.25
II. The California Ethics Standards
The California Ethics Standards promulgated by the Judicial
Council mandate comprehensive and specific rules for arbitrator dis-
closure and conduct. They apply to all neutral arbitrators conducting
contractual arbitrations in California, with certain listed exclusions. 26
The rules expand an arbitrator's duty of reasonable inquiry, which
requires that at a minimum, an arbitrator must disclose "all matters
that could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a
doubt that the proposed arbitrator would be able to be impartial." 27
Arbitrators must disclose any connection to the parties or attorneys, as
well as any connection the parties or attorneys have to the arbitrator's
immediate or extended family. 28
If an arbitrator wishes to entertain offers for other professional
relationships such as that of a mediator or other dispute resolution
neutral, the arbitrator must disclose to all parties in writing within ten
days of nomination that he or she will entertain such offers of employ-
ment.29 A party may then disqualify the arbitrator based on this disclo-
23. Governor Davis vetoed Assembly Bill 3029 on September 30, 2002, saying, "This
bill casts too wide a net and could have the unintended consequences of making Califor-
nia's arbitration provisions so complex that national companies would not be willing to
provide services in our state." Letter from Gray Davis, Governor of California, to Members
of the California State Assembly (Sept. 30, 2002) (on file with author). Since this bill had
also provided the definitions of "consumer" and other terms, new legislation will have to
be passed to add meaning to the other statutes. See A. 3029, 2001-02 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).
24. A. 1713, 2003-04 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).
25. A. 1714, 2003-04 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).
26. See ETHICS STANDARDS, supra note 13, std. 3 (specifically excluding collective bar-
gaining, international, judicial, attorney-client-fee, automobile warranty, worker's compen-
sation, and certain licensed contractor disputes).
27. Id. std. 7(d); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.9 (West Supp. 2003) (prescrib-
ing the same standard).
28. See ETHICS STANDARDS, supra note 13, std. 7(d).
29. Id. std. 12(b). The arbitrator is forbidden to act as an attorney, expert witness, or
consultant. Id. std. 12(a).
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sure.3 0 If no disclosure is made, the arbitrator is prohibited from
entering into any new dispute resolution relationship with the parties
or attorneys while the arbitration is pending.
3
'
Existing legislation requires an arbitrator to disclose information
from prior arbitrations within the past five years, including the service,
result, prevailing party, and monetary damages awarded in any prior
arbitration that involved any of the current parties or attorneys.3 2 The
Ethics Standards require arbitrators to provide a summary of that in-
formation if there have been more than five cases with any of the cur-
rent parties or attorneys.3 3 In addition, for the first time, the Ethics
Standards require an arbitrator to also disclose compensated service
as another dispute resolution neutral such as mediator, referee, or
neutral evaluator for the prior two years in which he or she served in a
dispute involving a party or a lawyer for the party.
3 4
In addition to disclosures, several provisions of the Ethics Stan-
dards now regulate arbitrator conduct. An arbitrator must conduct
the arbitration fairly, promptly, and diligently;3 5 must not have ex
parte communications with the parties;36 must not use any informa-
tion received in confidence for personal advantage;37 must be truthful
and accurate in marketing;38 and may not belong to any organization
practicing invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion,
national origin, or sexual orientation.39
More information must be provided when the arbitration is one
involving a consumer, employment, or health care contract.40 It is the
arbitrator's responsibility to disclose relationships between the arbitra-
tion provider organization and a party, lawyer, or law firm in the arbi-
tration.41 Gifts, favors, and any current or expected business between
the provider organization and a party or lawyer must also be disclosed
by the arbitrator.42 In addition, the arbitrator must disclose any finan-
30. Id. std. 12(b).
31. Id. std. 12(c).
32. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.9.
33. ETHICS STANDARDS, supra note 13, std. 8(b)(3).
34. Id. std. 7(d)(5).
35. Id. std. 13.
36. Id. std. 14.
37. Id. std. 15.
38. Id. std. 17.
39. Id. std. 7(d)(13).
40. Id. std. 8.
41. Id. std. 8(b)(1).
42. Id.
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cial relationships he or she may have with the provider organization,
including membership.43
The duty to disclose is a continuing duty.4 4 Disclosures need to be
made within ten days of appointment, 45 and if disclosure is made after
ten calendar days, or a party becomes aware that the arbitrator made a
material omission or misrepresentation, a party may serve a notice of
disqualification. 46 Arbitrators may be disqualified within fifteen days
after failure to make a timely disclosure. 47
HI. Arbitrator Reaction to the New Ethics Standards
The initial reaction of arbitrators upon the implementation of
these Ethics Standards was disbelief. Why was the Legislature, and par-
ticularly the Judicial Council, drafting rules that single out arbitrators?
After all, arbitrators are not responsible for originally imposing non-
negotiated arbitrations, they are only the neutral decision-makers try-
ing to bring about a fair resolution. Nothing in the new Ethics Stan-
dards would remedy the real problems of imposed arbitration. 48
Arbitrators overwhelmingly agree with the premise that the arbi-
tration process must be fair and impartial and that it is prudent to
disclose any possible connection to the parties or lawyers, but the new
Ethics Standards now obligate them to comply with twenty-seven addi-
tional pages of detailed disclosure rules. Before the Ethics Standards
became law, arbitrators in California were already subject to the na-
tion's most comprehensive statutory disclosure requirements. 49 With
43. Id. std. 8(c)(1).
44. Id. std. 4.
45. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.9(b) (West Supp. 2003).
46. See id. § 1281.91.
47. Id.
48. See Spalding, supra note 9:
Few experienced in arbitration would deny that there are problems in the whole-
sale use of adhesive arbitration clauses imposed upon unwitting individuals with-
out the bargaining power or knowledge to resist them. Imposition of a process
that, unlike the courts, is not subsidized, in cases where the individual likely can-
not afford to pay, or where its costs are excessive in light of the sums likely in
issue, is no less problematic.
Nothing in the Judicial Council's draft Arbitrator Ethics Standards will remedy
these problems, most or all of which cannot be cured effectively while the Federal
Arbitration Act continues to mandate enforcement of most arbitration clauses in
adhesive contracts not found unconscionable.
49. California, unlike other states, has enacted a number of disclosure statutes includ-
ing California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.9, the general disclosure statute which
incorporates by reference section 170.1, the standards for disqualification of judges. In
addition, section 1281.95 has special requirements for residential disputes, and section
1297.121 has special requirements for international arbitrations. The California disclosure
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these new Ethics Standards, even an inadvertent failure to comply
with the additional technical rules could destabilize the finality of all
arbitrations and perhaps even put them at personal risk for costs of a
vacated arbitration.
The California Arbitration Act contains several statutory provi-
sions requiring specific disclosures about connections to the parties
and their attorneys. One statute requires comprehensive disclosures
by the arbitrator, including "all matters that could cause a person
aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a doubt that the proposed
neutral arbitrator would be able to be impartial. '50 In addition, the
arbitrator is required to comply with another statute governing the
grounds for disqualification of a judge. 5t The California Ethics Stan-
dards simply repeat many of the same disclosure requirements. How-
ever, by emphasizing the same language and combining it with
additional detailed directives, arbitrators are worried about the unin-
tended consequences. Too many detailed directives could create new
loopholes to challenge otherwise non-contestable arbitration awards.
Because of the complexity of compliance and the potential for
inadvertent non-disclosure, some arbitrators have crafted agreements
which ask the parties to waive certain provisions of the Ethics Stan-
dards.52 Interestingly, the Ethics Standards are silent on such waivers,
so apparently do not prohibit them. Some arbitrators require parties
to waive provisions such as those requiring more tedious efforts to
determine if they have any connections to extended family mem-
bers.53 These arbitrators are making disclosures as comprehensive as
they can without undergoing a broad and wide-ranging search of fam-
ily member connections. 54
requirements are far more extensive than the disclosure requirements of the Revised Uni-
form Arbitration Act. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT of 2000, 7 U.L.A. 1-54 (West Supp. 2003),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/arbitrat1213.pdf (last accessed Oct.
24, 2003).
50. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.9 (also requiring arbitrators to disclose names of all
parties, dates, results, prevailing party and monetary damages awarded in any prior arbitra-
tion within the previous five years involving the same parties or attorneys).
51. Id. § 1281.9(a) (1) (referencing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.1).
52. Information derived from personal communications between author and arbitra-
tors about arbitrator declarations accompanying disclosures before appointment.
53. Id.
54. There is some confusion about how comprehensive these disclosures should be.
Compare ETHICS STANDARDS, supra note 13, std. 9(b) (allowing an arbitrator to fulfill the
disclosure obligation regarding family by asking immediate and extended family members
living in the household), with stds. 7(d)(1), 7(d)(2), and 7(d)(12) (requiring the disclo-
sure of relationships that extended family members may have to parties and attorneys in
the dispute as well as any knowledge they may have about the dispute), and std. 2(n) (de-
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Arbitrators believe that the Ethics Standards were prompted by
the perception that repeat-player arbitrators might be more interested
in re-appointment than justice. Consequently, the Ethics Standards
were drafted with a presumption that any pre-appointment disclosure
that reveals the arbitrator had worked with a party or attorney previ-
ously taints the arbitrator with bias. Statutes already required the dis-
closure of arbitrations with the same parties before the Ethics
Standards were enacted.5 5 However, just because an arbitrator may
have dealt with the same attorneys or parties previously does not nec-
essarily mean the arbitrator is biased. Rather, it may mean that the
arbitrator is familiar with a particular profession or area of law. As
Justice White wrote in a seminal Supreme Court case, "It is often be-
cause they are men [sic] of affairs, not apart from but of the market-
place, that they are effective in their adjudicatory function. '56
It is important to note that repeat players in the arbitration pro-
cess are not only arbitrators, but are also the same business entities
and the same plaintiff and defense attorneys. Since attorneys are the
ones who choose the arbitrators, they are often in a position to know
much more about conflicts than lawmakers acknowledge. In fact, it is
curious that both the Legislature and the Judicial Council are reluc-
tant to obligate attorneys and parties to make disclosures of any con-
flicts or relationships they may have with the arbitrator. Instead, it is
the sole responsibility of the arbitrator to discover and make those
disclosures even though information about his or her extended family
and former spouse's connections may be within the purview of the law
firms. Arbitrators can ask lawyers in writing if they are aware of any
other possible relationships. They must then declare in writing that an
inquiry has been made and attach copies of inquiry and any re-
sponses.57 Because arbitrators must make disclosures within a 10-day
fining "extended family members" expansively). As a result of this drafting inconsistency,
many arbitrators make further inquiry of their extended family members and former
spouses than the compliance model in std. 9(b) suggests, or they ask the parties for a
waiver of this inquiry.
55. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.9 (enacted in 1994).
56. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968)
(White, J., concurring) (holding that an arbitrator should disclose any dealings that might
create an impression of possible bias). The separate and concurring opinion of Justice
White stated that an arbitrator need only disclose when he or she has a substantial interest
in a firm that has done more than trivial business with a party. Justice Black's majority
opinion and Justice White's concurring opinion, while complementary, are contradictory,
and have challenged courts to develop a clear standard. See Ruth V. Glick, Arbitrator Disclo-
sure: Recommendation for a New UAA Standard, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 89, 94-97
(1997).
57. ETHICS STANDARDS, supra note 13, std. 9(c).
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period before appointment, it is unlikely that a response from the law-
yers will be given within that time frame. Because the Legislature did
not authorize the Judicial Council to have jurisdiction over anyone
but arbitrators, 5 attorneys technically do not have to comply.
IV. Potential Problems Under the Ethics Standards
A. Materiality
As practitioners see it, the most serious shortcoming of the Ethics
Standards is the failure to impose materiality standards. Any non-dis-
closure, no matter how immaterial, and any contravention of pro-
scribed conduct, no matter how trivial, has the potential to become
the basis for challenging the enforcement of the award. If the award is
challenged, there is the potential for arbitrators to become the target
of lawsuits brought by disgruntled parties.
Although the Ethics Standards state that they are "not intended
to affect any existing civil cause of action or create any new civil cause
of action,"59 many practitioners are wary of challenges to arbitration
awards that will hold the arbitrator liable for costs due to inadvertent
non-compliance. For example, an arbitrator may not know about, and
so inadvertently not disclose, a connection with an attorney who is
married to, but has a different last name from, an attorney in the arbi-
tration. Because attorneys technically do not have to comply with the
arbitrator's request for disclosure of any conflicts they may have with
the case, this scenario could balloon into a serious non-disclosure
event undermining the finality of the decision and removing any eco-
nomical advantage arbitration would have over civil litigation. It
would also put the arbitrator at risk for costs of defense from a chal-
lenge to the award based on the arbitrator's innocent failure to know
attorneys with different last names may be married to each other and
may in some way be connected to the case.
B. Consumer Arbitration
The Ethics Standards apply to all arbitrations, both commercial
and consumer. 60 Standard 8 provides additional requirements for the
arbitrator if the arbitration involves a consumer.61 A problem for arbi-
trators that may arise under the Ethics Standards is the possible mis-
58. See Folberg, supra note 10, at 345.
59. ETHICS STANDARDS, supra note 13, std. 1 (d).
60. See id. std. 3.
61. See id. std. 8.
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use of consumer status by parties. It is important to know at the outset
whether the arbitration is considered commercial or consumer be-
cause arbitrations involving a consumer require the arbitrator to make
additional disclosures. 62 A "consumer party" is defined as anyone who
acquires or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes, a subscriber to a health services plan, an individ-
ual with a medical malpractice claim, or an employee or applicant for
employment. 63 Consumer arbitrations are those arising from pre-dis-
pute provisions of a contract with a consumer party who was required
to accept the arbitration provision that was drafted by the non-con-
sumer party.64
If a party does not fall within these definitions but still maintains
that he or she is a consumer party, the arbitrator may face a challenge.
Arbitrators in consumer arbitrations are required at the outset to pro-
vide additional information about the ADR provider organization, in-
cluding any conflicts or financial relationships it may have with the
parties or attorneys.65 Arbitrators are only excused from providing this
additional information if they reasonably believe that the arbitration is
one not classified as consumer. 66 In administered arbitrations, the ar-
bitration provider will probably make the determination of consumer
status. When a party disagrees with that determination, it creates a
dilemma for the arbitrator who is subject to the authority of the Ethics
Standards, and who still needs to decide upon appointment whether
to make the additional required disclosures.
C. Unintended Consequences of the Ethics Standards
Statutes enacted by the Legislature for arbitration providers have
resulted in unintended consequences. One such statute, California
Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.96, requiring arbitration provid-
ers to collate and provide information on a searchable internet web-
site, was intended to identify large repeat users. But an unfortunate
by-product of this requirement was the disproportionate effect the
cost of collecting and maintaining information about consumer arbi-
trations had on small, community-based providers. Even though small
providers conducting fifty or fewer consumer arbitrations a year need
only provide data on paper semiannually, some of those community-
62. See id.
63. Id. std. 2(e).
64. Id. std. 2(d).
65. See id. std. 8.
66. Id. std. 8(a)(2).
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based providers with limited funds decided to eliminate arbitration
services for small claims altogether.67
If community arbitration programs disappear, small businesses,
individuals, and consumers may increasingly turn to mediation as a
solution. Mediation can be very effective in solving these disputes, but
only when an arbitration or litigation date exists to motivate the par-
ties to settle. Without a date for an adjudicative hearing, there is no
pressure for parties to reach an agreement. Therefore, a decreased
opportunity to arbitrate and decreased access to the judicial system
for small cases may also result in less settlement motivation in media-
tion for parties who wish to resolve their own problems.
V. Court Challenges to the Ethics Standards by the Securities
Industry
From the outset, self-regulatory organizations ("SRO") including
the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") asked the federal court to exempt
them from the California Ethics Standards.68 They claimed there was
already extensive federal oversight of SRO's by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, and also that the Ethics Standards were pre-
empted by the Federal Arbitration Act.69 The case was dismissed on
Eleventh Amendment grounds. 70 The NASD and the NYSE now ask
California consumers with pending cases to either waive the Ethics
Standards or have their cases heard in neighboring states.7'
Plaintiff attorneys representing customers were not happy about
waiving the Ethics Standards in order to get their clients an arbitra-
67. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West Supp. 2003). The San Diego Mediation
Center is one community-based provider that at this time no longer administers consumer
arbitrations. Personal Communication with Steve Dinkin, President, San Diego Mediation
Center, in San Diego, Cal. (Sept. 2003).
68. See Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council of Cal.,
232 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
69. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers Dispute Resolu-
tion, Inc. v.Judicial Council of Cal., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (No. C-02-3486-
SC), available at http://www.nasdadr.com/pdf-text/072202-ca-Complaint.pdf (last ac-
cessed Oct. 24, 2003) (seeking a declaration by the court that the Ethics Standards cannot
be applied to the NASD and the NYSE).
70. Nat'lAss'n of Sec. Dealers, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1063-64 (finding that the council and
the individual members of the council were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amend-
ment), appeal docketed, No. 02-17413 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2002).
71. An NYSE arbitration rule states that the customer may either request that the
appointment of arbitrators for a hearing be held outside California, or alternatively get a
hearing in California by waiving the California Ethics Standards for the appointed arbitra-
tors. See Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
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tion hearing in California, and some hoped to use the SRO's refusal
to abide by the Ethics Standards as grounds for moving their cases to
court. In Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,72 an investment account
customer moved to vacate a court order to compel arbitration on the
grounds that the NYSE's refusal to appoint an arbitration panel com-
pliant with the new Ethics Standards was an intervening change in
circumstances that required a denial of the motion to compel arbitra-
tion.73 In a long and contemplative decision, Judge Jeremy Fogel of
the United States District Court ruled that the California Standards
conflicted not only with the SRO's own arbitration rules,7 4 but also
with the comprehensive system of federal regulation of the securities
industry pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 75 and with
the Federal Arbitration Act. 76 Judge Fogel reasoned that to allow Cali-
fornia and other states to adopt different requirements would conflict
with the objectives of a federally regulated scheme of securities arbi-
tration and would lead to inconsistent disclosures and disqualifica-
tions across the states.7 7
Since no appeal of this case is contemplated currently, arbitrators
serving in SRO arbitrations in California, at least for now, are for all
practical purposes exempt from the exacting requirements of the Eth-
ics Standards. Those arbitrators must still comply with the equally de-
manding SRO disclosure rules. However, any challenge to an
arbitration award may not be based on the Ethics Standards if Mayo's
interpretation of federal law stands. At least one California state court
case has cited the federal district court Mayo decision as binding
precedent. 78
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1099.
74. Id. at 1105-07.
75. Id. at 1108-12; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-mm
(2000).
76. Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1112-16; see also Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-307 (2002).
77. Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1111; see also Wilmot v. McNabb, No. C-02-03720, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11364, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2003) (Judge Fogel again concluding
that an arbitration panel in a securities fraud case need not be compliant with the Califor-
nia Ethics Standards).
78. Biggs v. First Wall St. Corp., No. GIC 802682 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 13, 2003) (or-
der granting defendant's motion to compel arbitration). A federal ERISA case, Dick v.
Atrat. No. CV-F-02-6264 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2003) (order granting defendant U.S. Bancorp
Piper Jaffray's motion to compel arbitration), decided before Mayo, also compelled
arbitration.
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The Ethics Standards have been in effect for about a year at the
time of this writing. 79 Several more securities industry cases are cur-
rently pending. One case on appeal to the Ninth Circuit involves an
employee who filed a wrongful termination action and refused to sign
any waiver of the California Ethics Standards as required by the
NASD, and also refused to have his case heard in another state.8 0 This
case is being closely watched to see if it follows the reasoning in Mayo.
The state appellate courts, however, have had conflicting rulings,
with more cases on the docket. Recently, a state appellate court ruled
that a customer dispute must be sent to the trial court when a SRO,
here the NASD, refused to arbitrate in California under the Ethics
Standards. 8 1 The court disregarded Mayo, a federal case, and specifi-
cally did not rule on the preemption issue, stating that the issue has
not been resolved yet in California, and that the NASD is involved
actively in other litigation in the federal courts that will decide that
question.8 2 In another new but unpublished decision, the court ruled
that to require a customer to either waive the Ethics Standards or
agree to arbitrate in a neighboring state was, in effect, a Hobson's
choice. 83 Either way the customer must waive her right to compliance
with the Ethics Standards.8 4 The court did not consider federal pre-
emption because the issue was not briefed.8 5
In contrast, a recent unpublished decision by a California appel-
late court allowed the arbitration to go forward despite arguments
that the arbitration contract was facially illegal because it included a
provision that requires waiver of the Ethics Standards, having the ef-
fect of waiving a statutory protection provided under California law.8 6
79. The Standards went into effect on July 1, 2002. See ETHICS STANDARDS, supra note
13, std. 3(a).
80. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, No. CV-02-02051-SBA (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 7, 2003), appeal docketed, No. 03-15695 (9th Cir. April 15, 2003) (confirmed with Jo-
seph E. Floren of Steefel, Levitt & Weiss, who represent plaintiff/appellee Credit Suisse
First Boston Corp.).
81. The only exception would be if an out-of-state forum is proper. Alan v. Superior
Ct., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 377, 380 (Ct. App. 2003), appeal docketed, No. S119245 (Cal. Sept. 23,
2003).
82. See id. at 388-89 (referring to Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers Dispute Resolution, Inc.
v. Judicial Council of Cal., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2002), appeal docketed, No. 02-
17413 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2002)).
83. Linden v. Am. Express Financial, Inc., No. B162566, 2003 Cal. Ct. App. LEXIS
10031, at *6 (Oct. 27, 2003).
84. Id.
85. Id. at *9-10.
86. Rodriguez v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., No. D040868, 2003 WL 22089385, at *5
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that the contract was not illegal merely because it included a
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At least three other securities cases are now pending in state appellate
courts.
8 7
Challenges to the Ethics Standards are just beginning and incon-
sistent rulings will lead to uncertainty about their validity and enforce-
ment. Eventually, the California Supreme Court or the United States
Supreme Court, or both, will be called upon to interpret the complex-
ities these Standards have already engendered.88
VI. California Regulation Noticed in Other States
Some other pro-active state legislatures are beginning to form
their own ideas about arbitrator disclosure and ethics and taking note
of California's lead in drafting such legislation. At least two other
states, New York and Texas, have recently begun to draft legislation
regulating arbitrator disclosure for commercial arbitrations. Neither
state has passed such legislation yet. However, their approach is much
different from California's.
New York had selectively chosen some of the California require-
ments in its efforts to protect the state's interest in fair and impartial
securities arbitrations8 9 New York's proposed "Investment Banking
and Research Reform Act" is geared to protect consumers from invest-
ment fraud.90 One part of this legislation exhorts securities arbitrators
to comply with standards that seek to uphold the fairness of the arbi-
tration process and maintain the impartiality of all participants.91 The
provision that has the effect of waiving a statutory protection provided to a party under
California law).
87. Dupree v. E*Trade Securities, Inc., No. 02AS04482 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2003)
(petition to compel arbitration denied), appeal docketed, No. C043684 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 1,
2003) (confirmed with Joseph E. Floren, attorney of record for defendant/appellant
E*Trade Securities, Inc.); Bugarini v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., No. G031933 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 7, 2003) (confirmed with Douglas A. Ames, attorney of record for plaintiff/
respondent Oscar S. Bugarini);Jevne v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, No. B167044 (Cal.
Ct. App. May 13, 2003) (confirmed with Victor G. Zilinskas, attorney of record for peti-
tioner Jack Jevne).
88. It is interesting to note that the court challenges to the Ethics Standards thus far
have come from plaintiffs in securities industry cases where arbitration has been the norm
since 1987. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (com-
pelling parties to arbitrate claims arising under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934);
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (compelling par-
ties to arbitrate claims arising under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933). Yet, the
push for last year's arbitration reform came not from securities attorneys but from attor-
neys representing clients with employment or class action suits.
89. See S. 4617, 2003-04 Leg., 226th Sess. (N.Y. 2003); A. 7313, 2003-04 Leg., 226th
Sess. (N.Y. 2003).
90. See N.Y.S. 4617; N.Y.A. 7313.
91. See N.Y.S. 4617, § 18.
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Act repeats language found in both the California Ethics Standards
and statutes: "[A]n arbitrator must disclose all matters that could
cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a doubt that
the proposed arbitrator would be able to be impartial."9 2
The Act also follows California's Ethics Standards in other ways.
For example, the Act prohibits an arbitrator or members of his or her
family from accepting any gifts, bequests, or favors from notice of ap-
pointment until two years after the conclusion of the arbitration, and
forbids any ex parte communication except for administrative mat-
ters. 93 However, it parts company with California in disqualifying arbi-
trators who fail to comply with their obligations to make disclosures
only when there has been a material omission or material misrepre-
sentation in his or her disclosure.94
In Texas, introduced legislation recognized the benefits of arbi-
tration in providing faster and less costly resolution of disputes than is
generally available with litigation. The legislation set forth a basic sys-
tem for evaluating and ensuring the accountability of arbitrators and
arbitration providers. The bill required the arbitration services pro-
vider to file arbitrator disclosure information, including the names of
parties and their attorneys, the names of arbitrators, the date selected,
the name of arbitration provider, the nature of the dispute and the
relief requested, the decision and award, the date signed, and the fees
and expenses of the arbitration provider. 95 The bill also provided that
if an arbitrator or provider fails three times in a twelve-month period
to timely make such disclosures, they will be ineligible to conduct or
administer court-ordered arbitrations for a certain period of time. 96
Even though neither Texas nor New York has yet passed this legis-
lation, the question is whether proliferating legislation in different
states will result in a hodgepodge of state-ordered requirements that
92. Id.; see also ETHICS STANDARDS, supra note 13, std. 7(d) (14) (A) (requiring disclo-
sure of "[a] ny other matter that: (A) Might cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably
entertain a doubt that the arbitrator would be able to be impaitial."); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1281.9(a) (providing that "the proposed neutral arbitrator shall disclose all matters that
could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a doubt that the proposed
neutral arbitrator would be able to be impartial").
93. See N.Y.S. 4617.
94. See id. § 18.
95. See S. 328, 2003 Leg., 78th Sess. (Tex. 2003).
96. See id. Another bill which would have prohibited "loser pays" clauses in consumer
arbitration, like the California legislation, failed to be even brought up for vote in commit-
tee due to strong business community opposition. See ADRWORLD.COM, BUSINESS OPPOSI-
TION KILLS CONSUMER ARBITRATION BILL IN TEXAS (2003) at http://www.adrworld.com (last
accessed July 6, 2003).
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will supplement federal standards, or whether federal standards will
preempt individual state requirements with a more cohesive formula.
Some might argue that the Ethics Standards of California are pre-
empted now on the basis of the reasoning in Mayo.97 If other states
adopt legislation that mirror the Ethics Standards, they may also be
preempted when they are challenged in court. If there is no preemp-
tion, an assortment of arbitrator disclosure rules would be in effect
state to state.
However, a more likely scenario may unfold with the gaining pop-
ularity of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act ("RUAA"),98 which was
approved and recommended for enactment in all states in 2000.9 It
requires an affirmative and continuing duty by arbitrators to disclose
any facts that a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the
impartiality of the arbitrator. 100  The Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"),101 first drafted in 1925, does not have a disclosure statute
and provides that only evident partiality, fraud and corruption, and
certain arbitrator misconduct are grounds for vacating an award. 10 2
Simple failure of an arbitrator to disclose possible conflicts is not a
ground for vacating an arbitration award under the FAA, as it is under
the RUAA.
It is likely that the RUAA, now being adopted by many states,10 3
may become a prototype for the revision of the FAA. If that happens,
there is a more certain prospect for future preemption of various spe-
cial state arbitrator ethics standards, including those in California.
97. See Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1107-16 (N.D. Cal.
2003).
98. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT of 2000, 7 U.L.A. 1-54 (West Supp. 2003) (revising the
Uniform Arbitration Act of 1955, which was adopted in 49 states), available at http://
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/arbitratl2l3.pdf (last accessed Oct. 24, 2003).
99. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, A FEW FACTS ABOUT THE
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT (2000), at http://www.nccus.org/nccusl/uniformact-fact
sheets/uniformacts-fs-aa.asp (last accessed Oct. 24, 2003) (listing state adoptions and intro-
ductions of the RUAA).
100. UNIF. ARBITRATION Act § 12.
101. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000).
102. Id. § 10.
103. As of this writing, eight states have adopted the RUAA, and several more are close
to doing the same. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7A-1-44-7A-32 (Michie 2003); NEV. REV. STAT.
38.206-38.248 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 658-1-658-29 (Supp. 2002); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78-31a-101-78-31a-131 (2002) (effective May 15, 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.2
(2003); NJ. STAT. ANN § 2A:24-1-2A:24-11 (West Supp. 2003); H. 2279, 72nd Leg. Assem.
(Or. 2003) (signed by Governor July 27, 2003); S. 716, 2003 Gen. Assem. (N.C. 2003)
(signed by GovernorJuly 27, 2003); see also NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAws, A Few Facts About the Uniform Arbitration Act (2000), at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/
uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-aa.asp (last accessed Oct. 24, 2003).
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This would solve the problem of different state requirements for arbi-
trator disclosure in an era where conflicts commonly cross state lines
and arbitrators commonly sit on cases involving application of differ-
ent state law.
VII. Observations of and Alternatives to California
Arbitration Reform
The most likely reason that arbitration reform in California has
been focused on arbitrators is that reformists and some lawmakers
have been dismayed by the Supreme Court's steadfast refusal to allow
states to treat arbitration contracts differently from contracts in gen-
eral.104 The idea to regulate arbitrators through mandated ethical
standards may seem to be one way to balance the inequities of non-
negotiated contracts.10 5 Yet, it does nothing to alleviate the problem
of such contracts other than opening more grounds for challenging
otherwise binding arbitrations, and as a collateral result, possibly de-
stabilizing non-consumer arbitrations as well.
These challenges will only occur on the consumer side in the top
dollar cases where the potential reward of a big recovery trumps the
risk of a long and expensive appellate battle. On the defendant's side,
challenges will only be brought by deep pocket entities intent on set-
ting an example for future litigants. In the more common small cases,
where consumers have a hard time finding any lawyer willing to re-
present them, speedy and cost-effective final resolution will most likely
be lost as fewer arbitrators are willing to sit on low-paying arbitration
panels in light of the heavier duty (and potential liability) they have in
discovering and reporting connections to the parties and attorneys.
With the spotlight on arbitrator conduct, the energy to find a so-
lution to the problems of mandatory arbitration clauses in everyday
transactions is misdirected. There should be more contemplation of
other avenues to solve the problems of imposed arbitration. Consent
is one area to explore since it would eliminate federal preemption
problems. For example, requiring consumer approval is consistent
with requiring consent in any contract and therefore would not con-
flict with Supreme Court mandates.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
105. See Folberg, supra note 10, at 359 (suggesting that the reform in California was
driven by a backlash to balance the "big picture" between powerful companies and con-
sumers rather than about the fairness of specific arbitrations or the integrity of individual
arbitrators).
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Consent could be accomplished by providing the consumer or
employee with an ability to opt-out of the dispute resolution man-
date. 10 6 However, deciding how to formulate an opt-out provision will
be problematic. Plaintiffs may be content to have a voluntary opt-in
provision for arbitration after a dispute arises, but that option has
never been popular with non-consumer parties. This is because the
motivation for pre-dispute binding mandatory arbitration clauses is ei-
ther to keep egregious cases from a potentially generous jury or to
prevent class actions from proceeding, the very cases in which plain-
tiffs would not opt-in post dispute. 10 7
Some believe that the non-consumer party who imposes the arbi-
tration without allowing the consumer the opportunity to meaning-
fully consent should be bound to arbitrate, unless the consumer party
decides otherwise. The reasoning behind this position is to protect the
consumers with small claims who would not have the resources to pur-
sue their cause through litigation.
Another avenue to pursue in consumer arbitrations is to consider
making awards in mandatory consumer arbitrations non-binding and
allowing for some type of review for this class of arbitration.10 8 Alter-
natively, these arbitrations could operate much like judicial arbitra-
tions with parties having the opportunity for a trial de novo.'0 9
There needs to be a more thoughtful deliberation of how to as-
similate the benefits of a faster and less expensive dispute resolution
process with the ability of parties to get a procedure that corresponds
to the demands of their claims. Moreover, imposed consumer arbitra-
tion agreements should be considered separately from negotiated
commercial arbitration agreements because consent, a prerequisite
for contract formation, is missing. The cure for the former should not
spoil the benefits of the latter.
106. See Circuit City v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1198 (9th Cir. 2002) (involving an em-
ployment contract that gave the employee an opportunity to opt out of mandatory arbitra-
tion, which he did not exercise); Circuit City v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2002)
(giving current employees the opportunity to opt out of mandatory arbitration agree-
ments, which Mr. Najd did not exercise).
107. See generally David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitra-
tion Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law Adjudi-
cation, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2003) (explaining why post-dispute voluntary
arbitration is not a viable option).
108. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs. Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 684-85 (Cal.
2000) (mentioning but not elaborating on reasoned written awards and judicial review as
two elements of a fair arbitration process).
109. See CAL. R. CT. 1616.
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Conclusion
California arbitration reform will either set the norm for stronger
disclosure standards for the nation or it will in time be weakened by
court decisions embracing preemption arguments. Because of the
lack of materiality standards for arbitrator disclosure and conduct
compliance, the courts, and not the legislature, will eventually inter-
pret and determine the scope of the California Ethics Standards for
Neutral Arbitrators.
Both consumer and commercial arbitration should provide liti-
gants with a full, fair, and impartial hearing. However, the unresolved
issues of mandatory consumer arbitration clauses should not begin
and end with the regulation of arbitration and arbitration providers.
Negotiated commercial arbitration should not be destabilized by the
increased opportunity for collateral challenge as a result of non-con-
sensual consumer arbitration reform. A continuing exchange of ideas
about consent in contract formation or judicial review of awards in
mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion may be the
path for further discourse.
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